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Abstract
We consider a generalisation of Ekert’s entanglement-based quantum cryptographic
protocol where qubits are replaced by quN its (i.e., N -dimensional systems). In order
to study its robustness against optimal incoherent attacks, we derive the information
gained by a potential eavesdropper during a cloning-based individual attack. In doing so,
we generalize Cerf’s formalism for cloning machines and establish the form of the most
general cloning machine that respects all the symmetries of the problem. We obtain an
upper bound on the error rate that guarantees the confidentiality of quN it generalisations
of the Ekert’s protocol for qubits.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ud.03.67.Dd.89.70.+c
1 Introduction
In quantum cryptographic protocols, the presence of an eavesdropper in the communication
channel can be revealed through disturbances in the transmission of the message. To realize such
protocols, it is necessary to encode the signal into quantum states that belong to non-compatible
bases, as in the original protocol of Bennett and Brassard[1]. In 1991, Ekert suggested[2] a
scheme in which the security of quantum cryptography is based on entanglement. In this
scheme, one encrypts the key into the non-compatible qubit bases that maximize the violation
of local realism.
Recently it was shown that this violation is more pronounced for the case of entangled
quN its[3, 4, 5] for N > 2. Moreover, the qutrit generalisation of Ekert’s protocol is more robust
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and safer than its qubit counterpart[6, 7]. This naturally serves as a significant motivation for
studying the generalisation of Ekert’s protocol where qubits are replaced by quN its.
There are several ways of realizing quN its experimentally. One realization of quN its,
possibly the most straightforward one, exploits time-bins[8]. This approach has already been
demonstrated for entangled photons up to eleven dimensions[9]. Another possibility is to utilize
multiport-beamsplitters, and more specifically those that split the incoming single light beam
into N [10] outputs. Thus, an entanglement-based quantum cryptographic protocol based on
quN its instead of qubits can be realized with the current state-of-the-art quantum optical
techniques.
In this paper, we establish the generality of a class of eavesdropping attacks that are
based on (state-dependent) quantum cloning machines[11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. We shall show
that such attacks cannot be thwarted by Alice and Bob, the authorized users of the quan-
tum cryptographic channel, because the disturbance due to the presence of the eavesdropper
(Eve) perfectly mimics the correlations of an unbiased noise, at least for what concerns cor-
relations between the encryption and decryption bases that characterize the N dimensional
Ekert protocol. The security is shown to be higher for higher dimensional systems, a property
that was already noted for several qutrit-based protocols in comparison to their qubit-based
counterparts[6, 7, 17, 18, 19, 20].
2 The four quN it bases that maximize the violation of
local realism
In the Ekert91 protocol[2], the four qubit bases chosen by Alice and Bob are the bases that
maximize the violation of CHSH inequalities[21]. There exists a natural generalisation of this
set of bases in the case of quN its[4]. In analogy with the Ekert91 bases that belong to a great
circle on the Bloch sphere, these bases belong to a set of bases parametrized by a phase φ,
that we shall from now on call the φ bases. These bases are related to the computational basis
{|0〉, |1〉, ..., |N − 1〉}:
|lφ〉 = 1√
N
ΣN−1k=0 e
ik( 2pi
N
l+φ)|k〉, l = 0, ..., N − 1 (1)
It has been shown that when local observers measure the correlations exhibited by the
maximally entangled state |φ+N〉 = 1√N
∑N−1
i=1 |i〉 ⊗ |i〉 in the four φ bases that we obtain when
φi =
2pi
4N
· i(i = 0, 1, 2, 3), the degree of nonclassicality or violation of local realism that char-
acterizes the correlations increases with the dimension N [3, 4, 5]. It is also higher than the
degree of nonclassicality allowed by Cirelson’s theorem[22] for qubits, and higher than for a
large class of other quN it bases. Indeed, this can be shown by estimating the resistance of
non-locality against noise[3, 4], or by considering generalisations of the CHSH inequality to
bipartite entangled quN it states[5]. From now on, we call the four quN it bases that maximize
the violation of local realism the optimal bases.
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3 The N-dimensional Entanglement based (N-DEB) pro-
tocol
Let us now assume that the source emits the maximally entangled quN it state |φ+N〉 and that
Alice and Bob share this entangled pair and perform measurements along one of the optimal
bases described in the previous section.
In order to show that these bases are pairwise perfectly correlated, it is useful to present
an interesting property of the state |φ+N〉. Let us consider two bases: the ψ basis chosen
arbitrarily (with 〈i|ψj〉 = Uij), and its conjugate basis, the ψ∗ basis (with 〈i|ψ∗j 〉 = U∗ij). When
Alice and Bob share the maximally entangled state |φ+N〉 and that Alice measures it in the
ψ∗ basis and Bob in the ψ basis, their results are perfectly correlated. To see this, we note
that by virtue of the unitarity of the matrix Uij , |φ+N〉 = 1√N
∑N−1
k,l,m=0 |ψ∗l 〉〈ψ∗l |k〉⊗ |ψm〉〈ψm|k〉
= 1√
N
∑N−1
k,l,m=0 |ψ∗l 〉Ukl|ψm〉U∗km = 1√N
∑N−1
l,m=0 |ψ∗l 〉|ψm〉δml = 1√N
∑N−1
k=0 |ψ∗k〉|ψk〉, whenever Alice
projects the state |φ+N〉 into the conjugate basis ψ∗, she projects Bob’s component into the ψ
basis and reciprocally.
Moreover, the state |φ+N〉 can be rewritten as |φ+N〉 = 1√N (
∑N−1
i=1 (|i∗φ〉 ⊗ |iφ〉) where
|l∗φ〉 =
1√
N
ΣN−1k=0 e
−ik( 2pi
N
l+φ)|k〉(l : 0, ..., N − 1) (2)
Therefore, when Bob performs a measurement in the φ basis (|kφ〉) and Alice in its conjugate
basis (|k∗φ〉), their results are perfectly correlated. Now, the four optimal bases are pairwise
conjugate and hence perfectly correlated as well. To show the perfect correlation, we note that
for the phase that appears in Eq. (2), −k(2pi
N
l+φ) = k(2pi
N
(N − l− j)−φ+ j 2pi
N
) mod 2pi where
j is an arbitrary integer number. Now, N − l− j varies from 0 to N −1 ( mod N) when l varies
from 0 to N−1 which shows that the φ∗ basis is the same as the φ′ basis (with φ′=−φ+j 2pi
N
). It
is easy to check that, thanks to an appropriate choice of j, the bases associated to even values
of i (i = 0, 2, φi =
2pi
4N
· i) are preserved under phase conjugation, while the bases associated to
odd values of i (i = 1, 3) are interchanged. The four optimal bases are thus pairwise maximally
correlated.
In a natural generalisation of the Ekert91 protocol for quN its, denoted as the N -DEB
protocol (i.e. the N -dimensional entanglement based protocol) in analogy with the notation
adopted in Ref.[7] for the case N = 3, Alice and Bob share the entangled state |φ+N〉 and choose
their measurement basis at random among one of the four optimal quN it bases (according
to the statistical distribution that they consider to be optimal). Because of the existence of
perfect correlations between the conjugate bases, a fraction of the measurement results can be
used in order to establish a deterministic cryptographic key. The rest of the data, for which
Alice’s and Bob’s bases are not perfectly correlated, can be used in principle in order to detect
the presence of an eavesdropper for example with the help of generalized CHSH inequalities[5].
Let us now study the safety of this protocol against optimal incoherent attacks.
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4 Individual attacks and optimal cloning machines
We assume from now on that the noise that characterizes the transmission (this includes dark
counts in the detectors, misalignments of Alice and Bob’s bases, transmission losses and so on)
is unbiased (this is a very general assumption). Under such conditions, the state shared by
Alice and Bob must mimic the correlations that is observed when they share a state that has
the following form:
ρR,A(FN ) = (1− FN )|φ+N〉R,A〈φ+N |R,A + FNρnoiseR,A , (3)
where ρnoiseR,A =
1
N2
IˆR,A, and the positive parameter FN ≤ 1 determines the “noise fraction”
within the full state. In the following, we make the conservative hypothesis that all the errors of
transmission could be due to the presence of an eavesdropper who possesses a perfect (noiseless)
technology, controls the line of transmission and lets her state(s) |φ+N〉R,A interact with the one
originally shared by Alice and Bob and an auxiliary system (or probe). In principle, Eve is
free to use any interaction between one or several quN it pairs (originally prepared in the state
|φ+N〉R,A) and an auxiliary system of her choice. Eve could keep this auxiliary system isolated and
unperturbed during an arbitrary long period of time. On hearing the public discussion between
Alice and Bob, she performs the measurement of her choice on her system. In principle she
could let her auxiliary system interact with a series of successive signals and/or carry out her
measurement on a series of auxiliary systems. We limit ourselves to the situation where she
couples each signal individually to an auxiliary system (individual or incoherent attacks). It
could happen that coherent attacks (so-called joint or collective attacks, for a review, see e.g.
[23]) are more dangerous but presently nobody knows whether this is the case.
Let us assume that initially Alice and Bob share the state |φ+N〉 and that during an individ-
ual attack, Eve lets this state interact with her probe (which also belongs to a N2-dimensional
Hilbert space[23] which can be seen as the “mirror space” of Alice and Bob’s N2-dimensional
Hilbert space). Then, the most general cloning state |Ψ〉R,A,B,C where the labels R,A,B, C
are respectively associated to the reference R (Alice), the two output clones (A for Bob and
B for Eve), and to the (N -dimensional) cloning machine (C) is the element of a N4 dimen-
sional Hilbert space. Our task is to optimize this state in such a way that Eve maximizes her
information and minimizes the disturbance on the information exchanged between Alice and
Bob. Moreover, as the real disturbance along a transmission line is assumed to be unbiased,
the disturbance induced by the presence of Eve must mimic an isotropic disturbance so to say,
it may not depend (1) on the state that Alice and Bob measure when they measure in perfectly
correlated (conjugate) bases, and also (2) on which pair of such bases is selected; finally (3) it
must also mimic the correlations between the non-conjugate bases that would be observed in
the presence of real (unbiased) noise.
4.1 Invariance under relabelings of the detectors and Cerf states
Clearly the complexity of the problem to solve increases as the fourth power of the dimension
N . It is thus necessary to simplify the treatment as much as possible by taking account of
the intrinsic symmetries of the problem. According to the notation introduced in the previous
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section, let us consider an arbitrary basis, the φ basis associated to Bob, and its conjugate
basis, the φ∗ basis, associated to Alice. A fundamental symmetry characterizes such bases: the
states of the φ (φ∗) basis are permuted if we vary the phase φ by any multiple of 2pi
3
. It is easy
to show that any such permutation is generated by C, the generator of the cyclic permutations
that shifts each label of the states of the φ (φ∗) basis by unity (l → l + 1 ( mod N)). When
the condition (1) is fulfilled, so to say when the error rate does not depend on the label l, it is
natural to impose this invariance at the level of the cloning state. In order to do so, it is useful
to introduce the so-called Bell states. The N2 generalized Bell states are defined as follows[7]:
|Bψm∗,n〉R,A = N−1/2
N−1∑
k=0
e2pii(kn/N)|ψ∗k〉R|ψk+m〉A (4)
with m and n (0 ≤ m,n ≤ N − 1) labeling these Bell states. Obviously they are eigenstates
under the generator of cyclic permutations l → l + 1 for the eigenvalue e−2pii(n/N). Moreover
they form an orthonormal basis of the N2 dimensional space spanned by the product states
|ψ∗k〉R|ψl〉A (l, j = 0, ..., N − 1).
Note that all the Bell states are maximally entangled and that |φ+N〉 = |Bψ0,0〉. Let us
consider the fraction of the signal that is measured by Alice in the ψ basis and by Bob in
its conjugate basis (the ψ∗ basis). As these are perfectly correlated bases, this signal is not
discarded and it will be used afterwards, during the reconciliation protocol, to establish a fresh
cryptographic key. At this level, when Alice and Bob reveal publicly their choices of bases, Eve
will measure her ancilla in the basis that she deems to be optimal[23]. Eve is free to redefine
this basis thanks to an arbitrary unitary transformation according to her convenience. Taking
account of the dual nature of the “mirror” space assigned to Eve, it is natural that Eve fixes
this unitary transformation in such a way that she measures her copy in the same basis as Bob
(the ψ basis) and the cloning state in the conjugate basis (the ψ∗ basis). Expressed in these
bases, the most general state |Ψ〉R,A,B,C that is invariant under cyclic permutations of the labels
assigned to the detectors has then (up to an arbitrary redefinition of Eve’s basis) the following
form:
|Ψ〉R,A,B,C =
N−1∑
m,m′,n=1
am,m′,n|Bψm∗,n〉R,A|Bψm′,−n∗〉B,C (5)
where by definition
|Bψm′,−n∗〉B,C = N−1/2
N−1∑
k=0
e−2pii(kn/N)|ψk〉B|ψ∗k+m〉C (6)
Note that we introduced at this level two apparently different definitions of the Bell states.
Both can be re-expressed according to the synthetic expression:
|Bψ
m(∗),n(∗)
〉 = N−1/2
N−1∑
k=0
e2pii(kn/N)|ψ(∗)k 〉|ψ(∗)k+m〉 (7)
In the computational basis (where |k〉 = |k∗〉), these definitions coincide with the usual definition[13].
Indeed, our approach constitutes a covariant generalisation of Cerf’s formalism for cloning
machines[13]. At this level, the complexity of the problem to solve is only in N3, because we
projected the state |Ψ〉R,A,B,C onto the set of states that remains invariant under a shift unity
of the labels assigned to the basis states. We shall now show that it is still possible to reduce
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the complexity of the problem if we consider the question of optimality. Prior to this, let us
introduce the following definitions:
Definition 1: The pure state |Ψ〉R,A,B,C is a Cerf state iff, for a given basis (say the ψ basis),
|Ψ〉R,A,B,C =
N−1∑
m,n=1
am,n|Bψm∗,n〉R,A|Bψm,−n∗〉B,C (8)
Note that then TrB,C |Ψ〉R,A,B,C〈Ψ|R,A,B,C is diagonal in the Bell basis |Bψm∗,n〉R,A and
TrR,A|Ψ〉R,A,B,C〈Ψ|R,A,B,C is diagonal in the Bell basis |Bψm,n∗〉B,C . Beside, normalization im-
poses that
∑N−1
m,n |am,n|2 = 1.
Definition 2:
A (pure) Cerf state is optimal among the Cerf states (for a given quantum cryptographic
protocol) iff, for the same mutual information between Alice and Bob, the mutual information
between Alice and Eve corresponding to this state is superior or equal to the one corresponding
to any other (pure) Cerf state or to any mixture of them.
Theorem:
-Let us assume that an attack is characterized by a state |Ψ〉R,A,B,C that is invariant under
cyclic permutations of the labels of Alice and Bob’s basis states (in the ψ∗ and ψ bases).
-If the optimal Cerf state exists, then it is also optimal among all possible states |Ψ〉R,A,B,C .
Proof:
We have shown that the most general state |Ψ〉R,A,B,C that is invariant under cyclic per-
mutations of the labels of the optimal bases must necessarily fulfill Eq. (5) which does not
necessarily imply that it is a Cerf state. Nevertheless, by virtue of Eq. (7), we have that
|Ψ〉R,A,B,C〈Ψ|R,A,B,C = N−2∑N−1m,m′,n,m˜,m˜′,n˜,k,l,k˜,l˜=0 am,m′,na∗m˜,m˜′,n˜ei(2pi/N)((k−l).n−(k˜−l˜).n˜). (9)
|ψ∗k〉R|ψk+m〉A|ψl〉B|ψ∗l+m′〉C〈ψ∗k˜|R〈ψk˜+m˜|A〈ψl˜|B〈ψ∗l˜+m˜′ |C
The mutual informations must be estimated on the non-discarded signal that is measured in
the ψ∗ basis by Alice and in the ψ basis by Bob, while Eve measures product states of the type
|ψl〉B|ψ∗l′〉C . Therefore only the diagonal coefficients that appear in the expression of the density
matrix (Eq. (9)) are relevant. It is easy to check that for such coefficients m−m′ = m˜− m˜′, so
that |Ψ〉R,A,B,C〈Ψ|R,A,B,C is equivalent to a reduced density matrix ρredR,A,B,C defined as follows:
ρredR,A,B,C =
∑N−1
m,i,n,m˜,n˜=0 am,m′=m+i,na
∗
m˜,m˜′=m˜+i,n˜
|Bψm∗,n〉R,A|Bψm+i,−n∗〉B,C〈Bψm˜∗,n˜|R,A〈Bψm˜+i,−n˜∗|B,C
which in turn corresponds to the following mixture:
ρredR,A,B,C =
∑N−1
i=0 Piρ
i red
R,A,B,C , where
Piρ
i red
R,A,B,C =
N−1∑
m,n=0
am,m′=m+i,n|Bψm∗,n〉R,A|Bψm+i,−n∗〉B,C .
N−1∑
m˜,n˜=0
a∗
m˜,m˜′=m˜+i,n˜
〈Bψm˜∗,n˜|R,A〈Bψm˜+i,−n˜∗|B,C
(10)
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and Pi =
∑N−1
m,n=0 |am,m′=m+i,n|2. ρi redR,A,B,C is the projector onto the state |Ψ〉iR,A,B,C, with
|Ψ〉iR,A,B,C =
1√
Pi
N−1∑
m,n=0
am,m′=m+i,n|Bψm∗,n〉R,A|Bψm+i,−n∗〉B,C . (11)
Everything happens as if the above state was chosen with probability Pi without that
Eve is able to control this choice or even to get informed about it. Her information is thus
certainly less than the information that she would get if she was informed about this choice.
Beside, once the choice of a particular |Ψ〉iR,A,B,C is realized, the mutual information between
Eve and Alice is invariant when Eve chooses to re-label her detectors, in particular if she re-
labels them according to the rule |ψl〉B|ψ∗l+m+i〉C → |ψl〉B|ψ∗l+m〉 which sends |Bψm+i,−n∗〉B,C onto
|Bψm,−n∗〉B,C . Note that this re-labeling does not influence at all the statistical distribution of
Alice and Bob’s results and their mutual information. In conclusion, Eve’s information is in the
best case equivalent to the information that she would get by realizing the state |Ψ〉iR,A,B,C =
1√
Pi
∑N−1
m,n=0 am,m′=m+i,n|Bψm∗,n〉R,A|Bψm,−n∗〉B,C with probability Pi, and being informed about the
nature of this choice. This corresponds to a mixture of Cerf states, which ends the proof: when
optimal Cerf state exist(s), then, if a state |Ψ〉R,A,B,C belongs to the class of states defined in
Eq. (5) and is optimal it is necessarily equal to this (one of these) Cerf state(s).
This theorem shows that it is sufficient to optimize the cloning machines described by a
Cerf state which again reduces the complexity of the problem: such a state is now described,
according to Eq. (8) by N2 parameters am,n instead of the N
3 parameters am,m′,n. Note that
in Cerf’s approach, Eq. (8) was considered to be an ansatz[13]; the previous theorem shows
that its generality can be established on the basis of more general assumptions. The property
that was encapsulated in the previous theorem expresses a deep property of the Bell states.
Actually, from Eve’s perspective, everything happens as if different families of Bell states were
separated by a classical super-selection rule. It helps to understand why, when the optimal
state is pure it is sufficient to limit oneself to the quest of the optimal Cerf state.
4.2 Invariance under the choice of the optimal basis
At this level we did not exploit all the symmetries of the problem, we only made use of the fact
that inside a given pair of perfectly correlated (conjugate) bases, the labeling of the detectors is
defined up to a cyclic permutation. Another symmetry of the problem that we did not exploit
yet is the following: according to the condition (2), all pairs of perfectly correlated bases must
also be treated on equal footing. Therefore it is natural to impose that the optimal Cerf state
associated to the N -DEB protocol fulfills the following constraints
|Ψ〉R,A,B,C =
N−1∑
m,n=1
am,n|Bφ=0m∗,n〉R,A|Bφ=0m,−n∗〉B,C =
N−1∑
m,n=1
am,n|Bφ=
2pi
4N
m∗,n 〉R,A|Bφ=
2pi
4N
m,−n∗〉B,C = (12)
N−1∑
m,n=1
am,n|Bφ=
4pi
4N
m∗,n 〉R,A|Bφ=
4pi
4N
m,−n∗〉B,C =
N−1∑
m,n=1
am,n|Bφ=
6pi
4N
m∗,n 〉R,A|Bφ=
6pi
4N
m,−n∗〉B,C (13)
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The treatment of this type of constraint is developed in appendix. The result is extremely
simple: whenever 〈Bφ=
2pip
4N
i∗,j |Bφ=
2piq
4N
k∗,l 〉 6= 0 (where p, q,= 0, 1, 2, 3), then ai,j = ak,l. Actually
these results were already used in [7] for the treatment of the qutrit case but have not been
published yet. These constraints express the necessary and sufficient conditions for which the
Cerf state (Eq. (8)) that characterizes the cloning machine possesses biorthogonal Schmidt
decompositions in the Bell bases (Eq. (7)) associated to the four optimal bases simultaneously.
By a straightforward computation we get that
〈Bφ1i∗,j |Bφ2k∗,l〉 = 〈B0i∗,j|Bφ2−φ1k∗,l 〉 =
1
N
δj,l
N−1∑
p,q=0
δp−q,j(modN)
ei(−p(φ2−φ1)+q((φ2−φ1)+
2pi
N
(k−i))) (14)
In particular, we have that when j = l = 0, 〈Bφ1i∗,0|Bφ2k∗,0〉 = δi,k, which means that Bφ=0i∗,0 =
B
φ
i∗,0∀φ. When j = l 6= 0, |〈Bφ1i∗,j|Bφ2k∗,j〉| reaches the extremal values 1 or 0 only when φ1−φ2 is
an integer multiple of 2pi
N
. This is due to the fact that for such values the basis states |lφ1〉 are
equivalent to the states |lφ2〉, up to a cyclic permutation of the labels of the basis states and
we showed in a previous section that the Bell states are eigenstates under such permutations.
Otherwise, for intermediate values of φ these in-products are never equal to zero. Therefore
the Cerf state |Ψ〉R,A,B,C that is invariant for at least two distinct values of φ ( mod 2piN ) is
characterized by the NxN matrix am,n that obeys the following equations:
(am,n) =


v y1 y2 ... yN−1
x1 y1 y2 ... yN−1
x2 y1 y2 ... yN−1
. . . ... .
. . . ... .
. . . ... .
xN−1 y1 y2 ... yN−1


(15)
The (normalized) matrix am,n still contains 2(N −1) independent parameters. This shows that
it is not enough to impose the invariance of the state |Ψ〉R,A,B,C under cyclic permutations
of the basis states or under changes of bases in order to fix all the parameters of the cloning
state. We shall do this by optimizing the information gained by Eve. We shall impose that,
in virtue of the “mirror” property of the cloning transformation, when the detector associated
to the projector onto the state |kφ∗〉E|lφ〉E′ fires, the probability of the inference that Alice
and Bob’s state is |kφ∗〉A|lφ〉B is maximal. It is easy to check that the probability that Alice
and Bob’s state is |k′φ∗〉A|l′φ〉B conditioned on the observation by Eve of the state |kφ∗〉E|lφ〉E′
is equal to δk′−l′,k−l
|∑N−1n=0 al−k,nexp(i2piN (k′ − k)n)|2
N
∑N−1
n=0 |al−k,n|2
. Let us first assume that the fidelity and
the disturbances are fixed,(including the coefficients ai0 (i = 0, ...N − 1)). These parameters
will be varied them later. Using the method of Lagrange’s multipliers with the constraint
that
∑N−1
j=0 |aij|2 is constant, and maximizing the function |
∑N−1
j=0 aij|2 under the variations of
ai,1, ai,2, ...ai,N−1, we get that the N −1 dimensional vector (∑N−1j=0 aij ,
∑N−1
j=0 aij, ...,
∑N−1
j=0 aij) is
parallel to the N − 1 dimensional vector (ai,1, ai,2, ..., ai,N−1). The solution of these constraints
that corresponds to a maximum is the following: ai,1 = ai,2 = ... = ai,N−1 and the phase
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of these complex numbers is the same as the phase of ai,0. Now, as (ai,1, ai,2, ..., ai,N−1) =
(a0,1, a0,2, ..., a0,N−1)=(y1, y2, ..., yN−1) and (a0,0, a1,0, ..., aN−1,0) = (v, x1, ..., xN−1) in virtue of
Eq. (15), we get that y1 = y2 = ... = yN−1, and all the coefficients xi and yi have the same
phase as v. We can without loss of generality assume that this phase is zero. Moreover, we
must impose that all disturbances are equal; otherwise, Eve’s presence could be detected easily
by Alice and Bob. Indeed, at this level all the states of a same φ basis are not treated on
the same footing. This can be checked for instance by estimating the disturbances. There are
N-1 possible errors when copying the basis state |kφ〉 Depending on it being transformed into
|(k + i)φ〉( mod N , with i = 1, ..., N − 1). Therefore, we define N-1 disturbances D1, D2and
DN−1 corresponding to these N-1 errors. By a straightforward but lengthy computation, we
get that the ith disturbance is equal to |xi|2 +∑N−1j=0 |yj|2 (j = 1, ..., N − 1) which, in general,
is not independent on the label i. If we impose that the disturbances are independent of the
label i, we get x1 = x2 = ... = xN−1 and the matrix amn contains only real positive coefficients.
Taking account of Eq. (15), we obtain the final form of the matrix am,n:
(am,n) =


v y y ... y
x y y ... y
x y y ... y
. . . ... .
. . . ... .
. . . ... .
x y y ... y


(16)
Note that it is sufficient that the cloning state |Ψ〉R,A,B,C is invariant for two distinct values
of φ in order that it is invariant for all values of φ, so to say that it acts identically on each
state of the φ bases. Such a cloner is thus phase-covariant, in analogy with the qubit[24] and
qutrit cases[7].
We determined numerically the values of v, x and y for which Eve’s information is maximal
while the fidelity of Bob’s clone is fixed. Letting vary this fidelity, we determined the error rate
that corresponds to the crossing point of Bob and Eve’s mutual information relative to Alice’s
data (IAB = IAE). According to Csisza´r and Ko¨rner theorem [25] Alice and Bob can distill a
secure cryptographic key if the mutual information between Alice and Bob IAB is larger than
the mutual information between Alice and Eve IAE, i.e., IAB > IAE . If we restrict ourselves
to one-way communication on the classical channel, this actually is also a necessary condition.
Consequently, the quantum cryptographic protocol above ceases to generate secret key bits
precisely at the point where Eve’s information matches Bob’s information.
The threshold fidelities below which the security of the protocol is no longer guaranteed
are listed in function of the dimension N in the table 1. These values are the exactly the same
values as those obtained from a higher dimensional generalization of Ref. [26]. Note that in the
qubit (N=2) and qutrit (N=3) cases, we recover the properties (optimal fidelity, upper bound
on the error rate and so on) derived in the literature following Cerf’s approach[17, 27, 7] or
more general approaches[24, 28, 6]. The threshold fidelities that we obtained are lower than the
corresponding values in the case of symmetric cloners, which were derived in Ref.[29]. This is
due to the fact that in our approach Eve considers the full information contained in the clone (B)
and in the ancilla (C). In the large N limit, it is easy to show that IAE = 1−FA and IAB = FA.
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N FA
2 0.853553
3 0.775276
4 0.734178
5 0.708043
6 0.689788
7 0.676230
8 0.665708
9 0.657267
10 0.650319
∞ 0.5
Table 1: Fidelity for dimension 2 ≤ N ≤ 10
Thus, in this limit, we find that the cloner converges to the universal (isotropic) cloner while
the fidelity goes to fifty percent. The tolerable error rate has also been shown recently Ref. [30]
to tend to fifty percent with the dimension of quN its going to infinity (with N being a prime
number) in another prepare-and-measure scheme. It seems that this asymptotic behaviour is
quite general.
4.3 Correlations between non-conjugate bases
The unbiased noise that appears in Eq. (3) is characterized by a density matrix that is propor-
tional to the identity IˆR,A. Now, IˆR,A= IˆA.IˆR=
∑N−1
i=0 |ψ∗i 〉R〈ψ∗i |R.
∑N−1
j=0 |ψ˜j〉A〈ψ˜j|A where the
ψ and the ψ˜ bases can be chosen arbitrarily. This arbitrariness suggests some invariance of
the noise under local changes of basis. In particular, when Eve replaces the signal by a clone,
this invariance must be respected. According to the condition (3), this clone must mimic the
correlations between the non-fully correlated (non-conjugate) bases that would be observed in
the presence of real, unbiased, noise. We shall now show that this is well the case. In order
to do so, let us consider the reduced cloning state ρR,A = TrB,C |Ψ〉R,A,B,C〈Ψ|R,A,B,C obtained
after averaging over Eve’s degrees of freedom; according to Eqs. (1,2,4,8,16), and thanks to the
identities
|Bφ0∗,0〉 = |φ+N〉,
∑N−1
m=0,n=0 |Bφm∗,n〉R,A〈Bφm∗,−n|R,A = IˆR,A, and
∑N−1
n=0 e
−2pii((k−l)n/N) = N.δk,l,
we get:
ρR,A = v
2|Bφ0∗,0〉R,A〈Bφ0∗,0|R,A + x2
N−1∑
m=1
|Bφm∗,0〉R,A〈Bφm∗,0|R,A + y2
N−1∑
m=1,n=0
|Bφm∗,n〉R,A〈Bφm∗,−n|R,A
= (v2 − x2)|φ+N〉R,A〈φ+N |R,A + (x2 − y2)
N−1∑
m=0
|Bφm∗,0〉R,A〈Bφm∗,0|R,A + y2
N−1∑
m=0,n=0
|Bφm∗,n〉R,A〈Bφm∗,−n|R,A
= (v2 − x2)|φ+N〉R,A〈φ+N |R,A +N.(x2 − y2)
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
|n〉R|n〉A〈n|R〈n|A +N2.y2ρnoiseR,A (17)
In comparison to Eq. (3) a new factor weighted by N.(x2 − y2) appears in the previous
expression. It is a mixture of projectors on products of the states of the computational basis
|n〉R|n〉A.
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For what concerns measurements performed by Alice and Bob in the optimal bases (that
they are conjugate or not), any such product has the same statistical properties as the unbiased
noise ρnoiseR,A =
1
N2
IˆR,A. The deep reason for this property is that the in-product between any
state of the computational basis and any φ state is in modulus squared equal to 1
N
, in other
words, both bases are mutually unbiased. Henceforth, the modulus squared of 〈n|R〈n|A|k∗φ1〉|lφ2〉
is equal to 1
N2
, whatever the values of the labels k and l could be.
5 Conclusions
The Ekert91 protocol[2] and its quN it extension, the N -DEB protocol which is analyzed in the
present paper, involve encryption bases for which the violation of local realism is maximal. If
Alice and Bob measure their member of a maximally-entangled quN it pair in two “conjugate”
bases, this gives rise to perfect correlations. After measurement is performed on each member
of a sequence of maximally-entangled quN it pairs, Alice and Bob can reveal on a public channel
what were their respective choices of basis and identify which quN it was correctly distributed,
from which they will make the key. They can use the rest of the data in order to check that it
does not admit a local realistic simulation. For instance they can check that their correlations
violate some generalized Bell or CHSH inequalities[5]. More generally, they can check that the
correlations between their results (that they are perfectly correlated or not are the same as
the results that they expect in the presence of unbiased noise. Note that the optimal bases do
not allow them to differentiate a fully unbiased noise (described by a fully incoherent reduced
density matrix proportional to the unity matrix) from a “colored” noise that would contain
projectors (with arbitrary weights) on product states of the computational basis. As shown
at the end of the last section, this is due to the fact that all the optimal bases are mutually
unbiased relatively to the computational basis. This explains why the phase-covariant attacks
are more dangerous than the universal (state-independent) attacks. For instance, the maximal
admissible error rate (when attacks based on state-dependent cloners are considered) was shown
to be equal to EA = 1 − FA = 1 − (12 + 1√8) ≃ 14.64% for the 2-DEB protocol (or Ekert91
qubit protocol) [24, 28, 27] and to 22.47 % for the 3-DEB protocol[6, 7]. The corresponding
rates, if we restrict ourselves to state-independent cloners[13] were shown in Ref.[17] to be
respectively equal to 15.64% and 22.67%. These results were derived for a slightly asymmetric
state-independent cloner[13, 17] that clones all the states with the same fidelity. Universal
attacks correspond to protocols in which Alice and Bob have the physical possibility to measure
(distinguish) experimentally any coefficient of the reduced density matrix which is not the case
here. This is the price to pay, but, at the same time, as the resistance of the violation of local
realism against noise is maximal when the maximally-entangled quN it pair is measured in the
optimal quN it bases discussed here[3, 4], the N -DEB protocol is optimal from the point of view
of the survival of non-classical correlations in a noisy environment.
Actually, it has been shown[5] that the violation of a Bell inequality extended to quN its is
possible, as long as the “visibility” of the two-quN its interference exceeds a threshhold value Vthr
given by the equation N
2
Vthr(N)
=
∑[N/2]−1
k=0 (1− 2kN−1)( 1sin2(pi(4k+1)/4N)− 1sin2(pi(4k+3)/4N) ). The visibility
mentioned above is directly related to the threshold fraction of unbiased noise, (1 − Vthr(N)),
which has to be admixed to the maximally entangled state in order to erase the non-classical
character of the correlations, and therefore is a measure of robustness of non-classicality (see
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also [3, 4]). This means that the non-existence of a local realistic model of the correlations
is guaranteed if the fidelity Fthr that characterizes the communication channel between Alice
and Bob, (detectors included, so 1-Fthr is the effective error rate in the transmission) is larger
than N−1
N
× Vthr(N) + 1N . For instance, for N = 2, 3, 4, 5 and 10, 1-Fthr is equal to 14.64 %,
20.26 %, 23.21 %, 25.03 % and 28.77 % respectively. On the other hand, the N -DEB protocol
is secure against a cloning-based individual attack, if F = 1 − EA > FA = Fthr (see table).
If we compare the previous values of 1-Fthr with the corresponding values of 1-FA (with FA
given in the table), it is easy to check that when a violation of local realism occurs, the security
of the N -DEB protocol against individual attacks is automatically guaranteed. Therefore, the
violation of Bell inequalities is a sufficient condition for security, as it implies that Bob’s fidelity
is higher than the security threshold. For qubits the sufficient condition (FA > 0.8436) is also
necessary ([23]).
In addition, the violation of Bell inequalities guarantees that the N -DEB protocol is secure
against so-called Trojan horse attacks during which the eavesdropper would control the whole
transmission line and replace the signal by a fake, predetermined local-variable dependent,
signal that mimics the quantum correlations (see Ref.[7] and references therein). All the pro-
tocols in which no entanglement is present (such as BB84[1], the 6-state qubit protocol[28, 16],
or the 12-state qutrit protocol[18]) admit a local realistic model, so that they are not secure
against Trojan horse attacks, although, according to the results of Ref.[17] they are slightly
more resistant against noise than the N -DEB protocol.
As we have already noted, our results confirm the results that can be found in the literature
relatively to the security of the 2-DEB and 3-DEB protocols, but at the same time our results
are confirmed by the corresponding results in the case that they were derived under constraints
more general than the ones that we postulated. Note that in order to find an expression for the
cloning state that is valid for arbitrary dimension, it is impossible presently to avoid some extra-
assumptions, for instance that the optimal cloning state is pure, N4 dimensional, symmetric
under cyclic permutations of the labels of the optimal bases and so on. These assumptions are
very reasonable anyhow. If we would try to avoid any extra-constraint, the complexity of the
problem would increase with the dimension N and we could not find a solution for all values of
N . Note also that the security of quantum cryptographic protocols against incoherent attacks
was never clearly established, simply because the problem is too complicate to tackle.
In summary, we have established the generality of Cerf’s approach of quantum state-
dependent cloning machines under fairly general assumptions. We have shown that the ac-
ceptable error rate of the N -DEB protocol turns out to increase with the dimension N . Our
analysis confirms a seemingly general property that the robustness against noise of quN it
schemes increases with the dimensionality N .
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6 Appendix: Invariance of the cloning state.
Let us consider a reference basis, the ψ basis, its conjugate basis the ψ∗ basis, another basis,
the ψ˜ basis and its conjugate basis the ψ˜∗ basis (with 〈i|ψj〉 = Uij and 〈i|ψ˜j〉 = U˜ij). Let us
assume that during the realisation of a quantum cryptographic protocol, Alice and Bob share
the maximally entangled state |φ+N〉 (|B0,0〉) and that Alice measures it either in the ψ∗ basis
or in the ψ˜∗ basis (with 〈i|ψ∗j 〉 = U∗ij and 〈i|ψ˜∗j 〉 = U˜∗ij). according to the proof given in the
section 2, she projects Bob’s component onto either the ψ or the ψ˜ basis. If we require that the
cloning machine is invariant in both bases, the joint (Cerf) state of the reference R, the two
output clones (A and B), and the (N -dimensional) cloning machine C (Eq. (8)) must fulfill the
following condition:
N−1∑
m,n=0
am,n |Bm∗,n〉R,A|Bm,−n∗〉B,C =
N−1∑
m,n=0
am,n |B˜m∗,n〉R,A|B˜m,−n∗〉B,C (18)
As the N2 Bm,n states form an orthonormal basis, we can project the righthand side of the
previous equality onto them, which gives:
∑N−1
m,n=0 am,n|Bm∗,n〉R,A|Bm,−n∗〉B,C =
∑N−1
m,n,m′,n′,m′′,n′′=0 am,n
|Bm′∗,n′〉R,A R,A〈Bm′∗,n′|B˜m∗,n〉R,A |Bm′′,−n′′∗〉B,CB,C〈Bm′′,−n′′∗|B˜m,−n∗〉B,C
Denoting Vi,j,k,l the in-product 〈Bi∗,j|B˜k∗,l〉, we get: ∑N−1m,n,k,l=0 am,nδ(m,n),(k,l)|Bm∗,n〉R,A|Bk,−l∗〉B,C =
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∑N−1
m,n,m′,n′,m′′,n′′=0 am,n |Bm′∗,n′〉R,AVm′,n′,m,n |Bm′′,−n′′∗〉B,CV ∗m′′,n′′,m,n =
∑N−1
m,n,i,j,k,l=0 ai,jδ(i,j),(i′,j′)
Vm,n,i,j V
∗
k,l,i′,j′ |Bm∗,n〉R,A|Bk,−l∗〉B,C . Thanks to the orthonormality of the Bell bases, this con-
straint can be expressed as a matrix relation of the form VA = AV where V and A are N2xN2
matrices defined as follows: Vi,j;k,l = 〈Bi∗,j|B˜k∗,l〉 and Ai,j;k,l = ai,jδ(i,j),(k,l). Such a system of
linear equations is extremely simple to solve: if Vi,j;k,l 6= 0, then ai,j = ak,l. The procedure to
follow in order to build a cloning machine that is invariant in the ψ basis and the ψ˜ basis is thus
straightforward: compute the N4 in-products Vi,j;k,l = 〈Bi∗,j|B˜k∗,l〉 (i, j, k, l = 0, ..., N − 1); if
Vi,j;k,l 6= 0, then ai,j = ak,l. The solutions am,n of this set of equations define the most general
Cerf state (Eq. (8)) that is invariant in the two bases.
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